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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
through the negligence of one charity is apt to place the burden of aid upol
another charity or cause the injured to become a public charge.2"5
The court in the instant case overruled two Iowa cases which approved
of immunity20 thereby allying itself with the courts favoring liability and
furthering this trend. With the reasons for allowing immunity no longer
existent, it is not for the court but for the legislature, if they arc of the opin-
ion that public policy still demands a limitation of the liability of charitable
institutions, to grant immunity.27 It is submitted that the decision in the
instant case, in the absence of declaratory legislation, will permit holdings
by the Iowa courts in favor of the person for whom the charity of a charit-
able hospital is in reality intended-the non-paying patient.
TORTS-LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO RECOVERY
UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
Plaintiffs sought to recover tinder the Federal Tort Claims Act' for
damage to property resulting from dynamite blasting operations of the
United States in deepening a channel of the Mississippi River for naviga-
tional purposes. Held, in sustaining defendant's motion to dismiss, that
dynamiting was part of a discretionary plan of the army engineers and within
an exception 2 to the Federal Tort Claims Act. Boyce v. United States, 93
F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
Substantially, the Federal Tort Claims Act is a waiver of governmental
immunity in tort3 restricted only by enumerated exceptions including that
exception, herein disputed, which precludes recovery against the govern-
ment for discrctionary acts.1 Liability can never be predicated upon the
abuse of such discretion," but only upon a breach of those ministerial duties
wherein no room for speculation or judgment is permitted. The apparent
difficulty is that no yardstick has ever been presented for establishing a
criterion which would clearly determine at what point it may be said that a
particular part of a discretionary plan becomes so insignificant or elementary
as to be classified "ministerial."
25. See Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, supra note 7, at 373; 2 BoCERT-,
IRUSTS AN!) TRUSTEES, § 401.
26. Servison v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 230 Iowa 86, 296 N.W. 769 (1941);
Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy, 226 Iowa 374, 284 N.W. 186 (1939).
27. Glavin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R.I. 411, 435 (1879); Rickbeil v. Grafton
Deaconess Hospital, 74 N.D. 525, 23 N.W.2d 247, 260 rehearing denied (1946).
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1946).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1946).
3. United States v. Spelar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949).
4. See note 2 supra; 35 GEORGETOWN L.J. 1 (1946).
5. Feres v. United States, 71 Sup. Ct. 153 (1950).
6. 56 YALE L.J. 534, 543-545 (1947).
7. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Johnson v. Langford, 270 U.S.
541 (1925); Jernigan v. Loid Rainwater Co., 117 S.W.2d 18 (Ark. 1938); State ex rel.
Hammond v. Wimberly, 196 S.W.2d 561 (Tenn. 1941).
CASES NOTED
In Coates v. United States,8 the course of the Missouri River was alter-
ed, in accordance with an approved plan, whereby plaintiff's lands were dam-
aged and, notwithstanding the continuing trespass which ensued, the plan
as carried out was held discretionary. Dicta in the case made the distinc-
tion that if the act complained of was based upon negligence in the carry-
ing out of the approved plan, it would in all probability be a breach of a
ministerial function; but not so if the plan so approved was negligently
formulated. Cases factually similar10 to the instant case and the Coates
case form a uniform pattern in precluding liability despite an abuse of this
discretion in accord with the remaining portion of the exception in question.
Further investigation reveals a novel convolution in personal injury
actions in contradistinction to those cases similar in facts and results to the
instant case wherein a discretionary act is given primary consideration. Lip
service is paid in some cases to that portion of the exception which deals
with an abuse thereof. Failure of an army hospital to provide medical
care for an officer's wife has been held discretionary in character;" but,
where, after admission, where the injury occurred through the negligence of
an employee, failure to exercise reasonable care resulted in liability.' 2 Sim-
ilarly, discharging of a veteran from a government hospital was held purely
discretionary and there was no liability for death of one killed by the veteran
so released.' 3 However, where an employee of a veterans hospital was in-
jured through the negligence of an agent in administering medication, lia-
bility attached albeit violation of regulations to treat chronic cases.' 4
The rationale employed by the court in the instant case was that
though the blasting was the proximate cause of damage to plaintiff's prop-
erty, liability was not incurred since the use of dynamite was an integral
part of the proposed plan. Under the interstate commerce power of the
government, a decision to deepen the navigable waters of a river, in conform-
ity with the plan of the army chief of engineers, was purely a discretionary
function.
Thus, from these decisions, we observe a series of acts committed in
the performance of a discretionary function, wherein either gross negligencc
is substantiateda or the wisdom whichi motivates the particular plan to be
followed is without rhyme or reason.' 8 Yet the courts, by some mystically
formulated slide rule and through nebulous reasoning, have calculated a dis-
tinction between discretionary and ministerial acts. In interpolating the
8. 181 F.2d 816 (8th Cir. 1950).
9. Id. at 820.
10. Olsen v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 150 (D. Utah 1950); Pacific Nat. Fire Ins.
Co. v. T.V.A., 89 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Va. 1950); Thomas v. United States, 81 F.
Supp. 881 (W.VD. Mo. 1949).
11. Denny v. United States, 171 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1948).
12. Costley v. United States, 181 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950).
13. Kendrick v. United States, 82 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ala. 1949).
14. Dishman v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 5 (. Md. 1950).
15. Pacific Nat. Fire Ins. Co. v. T.V.A., supra note 10.
16. Olsen v. United States, supra note 10.
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facts and decisions it appears that the index presents a finding based upon
public policy,7 or a liberal construction in favor of the United States in
return for its waiver of sovereign immunity, 8 or upon some caliginous pre-
cept clothed in "Fabian policy," resulting in nothing more than a double
entendre.'0
It is submitted that the Federal Tort Claims Act is a new highway
leading to redress for wrongs of the Government but signposts leading to
this highway are labelled in the vague and variable terms "No entering if
the wrong committed against you resulted from a discretionary act." This
ambiguity encourages terminological confusion which could be remedied
by erecting an infallible guide rather than a signpost showing a vague
direction.
17. Ure v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 779 (D. Ore. 1950).
18. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584 (1941).
19. Boyce v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 866 (S.D. Iowa 1950).
